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A B S T R A C T
Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) was originally conceived to ad-
dress the global problem of climate change by reducing deforestation and forest degradation at national and
subnational levels in developing countries. Since its inception, REDD+ proponents have increasingly had to
adapt global ideas to local demands, as the rollout process was met with on-the-ground realities, including
suspicion and protest. As is typical in aid or ‘development’ projects conceived in the global North, most of the
solutions advanced to improve REDD+ tend to focus on addressing issues of justice (or ‘fairness’) in distributive
terms, rather than addressing more inherently political objections to REDD+ such as those based on rights or
social justice. Using data collected from over 700 interviews in ﬁve countries with both REDD+ and non-REDD
+ cases, we argue that the failure to incorporate political notions of justice into conservation projects such as
REDD+ results in ‘messiness’ within governance systems, which is a symptom of injustice and illegitimacy. We
ﬁnd that, ﬁrst, conservation, payment for ecosystem services, and REDD+ project proponents viewed problems
through a technical rather than political lens, leading to solutions that focused on procedures, such as ‘beneﬁt
distribution.’ Second, focusing on the technical aspects of interventions came at the expense of political solutions
such as the representation of local people’s concerns and recognition of their rights. Third, the lack of attention
to representation and recognition justices resulted in illegitimacy. This led to messiness in the governance
systems, which was often addressed in technical terms, thereby perpetuating the problem. If messiness is not
appreciated and addressed from appropriate notions of justice, projects such as REDD+ are destined to fail.
1. Introduction
In the last decade, important new global conventions and initiatives
such as Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD+), the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable
Development Goals have been launched to address climate change and
development. These initiatives advance international strategies for ad-
dressing global problems that have profoundly localised eﬀects. They
are therefore likely to generate friction among actors operating at
multiple levels with myriad diﬀerent interests, concerns, and
perspectives (Sanders et al., 2017; Martin et al., 2016). In this con-
tribution, we focus on conservation, payment for ecosystem services
(PES) and REDD+. With climate change increasingly on global
agendas, there is a growing morass of actors involved in large-scale
initiatives to align land and forest use with climate mitigation goals.
Therefore, examining the ways in which actors interact with one an-
other, and the logics with which arguments are framed, is especially
prudent in order to better understand on-the-ground outcomes of
emerging programs that aspire to improve environmental, social, and
governance outcomes.
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In this contribution, we seek to understand more clearly what ap-
pears to be a fundamental contradiction: global actors continue to apply
problematic large-scale technical solutions (Sunderlin and Sills, 2012;
Blom et al., 2010; DeShazo et al., 2016) to issues that are broadly re-
cognised as deeply political (Doolittle, 2010). We explore the mani-
festations of this problem using data from a qualitative, nested com-
parative study of 54 land use change initiatives in 11 subnational
regions in ﬁve countries, and analyse them by linking diverging con-
cepts relating to the ‘technical’ and ‘political’ aspects of governance
with notions of environmental justice and legitimacy. We use ‘legiti-
macy’ in a sociological sense, pertaining to the extent to which others
believe an institution to have the right to authority, rather than in the
normative sense, which is related to the right to rule (cf. Buchanan and
Keohane, 2009). These cases were selected to contrast emerging in-
itiatives to reduce deforestation with sites where conventional agri-
cultural and extractive economic activities are causing or threatening to
cause deforestation. Because the initiatives to reduce deforestation
were undergirded by global environmental politics, including ambitious
multilateral initiatives like REDD+, they provide an opportunity to
examine theories that link multi-level governance institutions and en-
vironmental justice in an urgent context. The research was not designed
with such a task in mind. Rather, the ideas and model presented here
should be considered exploratory, emerging from the analysis of the
cases, in light of existing theory. Our goal is to advance theoretical ideas
that implore diﬀerent actions by governments, NGOs, activists, and
researchers, both echoing and clarifying long-standing calls by other
scholars and activists.
The word ‘governance’ is sometimes used as a technical alternative
to the more political ‘reform’ or ‘social change’ (de Alcantara, 1998),
but we consider governance to be both technical and political. The case
can be made that the term ‘governance’ proliferated throughout the
global development apparatus in the 1980s and 1990s precisely be-
cause it oﬀered a cozy alternative to the term ‘politics’, which inter-
national aid agencies were not permitted to discuss (Leftwich, 1994;
Rose,1999). Technical perspectives of governance include apolitical
and inoﬀensive (at least to a quorum of hegemonic powers) terminol-
ogies and logics of rules and standards. This may involve an emphasis
on ‘safeguards’ for example, for which technical deﬁnitions exist to
‘protect vulnerable populations’, or ‘sustainability’, which some see as a
technocratic diversion from land tenure rights (cf. Bending and
Rosendo, 2006). Technical governance perspectives seek legitimacy in
rules, and sometimes narrow considerations of fairness.
Political perspectives, on the other hand, are more elusive to deﬁ-
nition, more contested, and legitimised through tradition, culture and
power relations (Fraser, 2009; Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). Contesta-
tions over rights, for example, exemplify political negotiation (Larson,
2011). Technical perspectives are sometimes required in order to focus
complex discussions among disparate actors to come to some form of
action, but in the process, political notions are often lost, or obscured
deliberately, by negotiators.
Land rights and land use decisions are necessarily political in the
traditional sense that they have a bearing on “who gets what” (Lasswell,
1950), but they also have profound implications for justice, as diﬀerent
land use decisions and decision-making processes privilege particular
notions of justice. Some land use decisions, such as performance-based
payments for conservation outcomes, view justice as primarily ‘dis-
tributive’, in that an equitable distribution of material resources is
largely equated, at least implicitly, with justice (Martin et al., 2013).
Other approaches to conservation, such as rights-based strategies, pri-
vilege notions of justice built around “recognition” of rights and “re-
presentation” in political spaces (Brockington et al., 2006; Ribot, 1996;
Brockington et al., 2008).
Further complicating issues of justice embedded in the politics of
land use are questions of scale (Fraser, 2009). As the politics of land use
involve negotiations between actors from many diﬀerent levels and
with diverse interests - from smallholder farmers who struggle to meet
their basic needs, to regional and national government oﬃcials with
mixed mandates to promote both environmental conservation and
economic development, to donors and environmentalists operating
both locally and internationally– who should even be considered in
questions of justice, whether distributive or recognition-oriented, is it-
self contested.
In the following section, we explore the ideas of ‘rendering tech-
nical’, environmental justice, and legitimacy. Following our introduc-
tion of theory, we present empirical evidence on land use changes in
ﬁve countries. Through our analysis, we show how the concept of
‘messiness’ provides insight into how projects behave and what we
might learn from them to improve eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency and equity
in attempts to address global climate change through forest conserva-
tion.
2. Theory
2.1. Rendering technical and anti-politics
We use Li’s (2007a,b) turn of phrase ‘rendering technical’ to de-
scribe the ways in which the political is made technical (see also
Colchester, 1994; Ferguson, 1994). Li (2007a), p.263 identiﬁes six ways
in which actors are brought together in an assemblage, which we spe-
cify here to mean a project aiming to reduce carbon emissions from, or
conserve, forests. She shows that such assemblages feature the fol-
lowing: 1) forging alignments, 2) rendering technical, 3) authorising
knowledge, 4) managing failures, 5) anti-politics, and 6) reassembling.
These processes are conducted by a range of actors, and from divergent
perspectives. Rendering technical involves investigating, mapping,
classifying, and documenting local communities, sometimes using
‘participatory processes’ that make assumptions about who should
participate, where boundaries should be drawn, and the nature of the
problem being one that can be solved through technical means (Li,
2007b, 2011). Milne and Adams (2012) show an analysis of how REDD
+ projects in Cambodia are made anti-political through rendering
technical in order to set clear boundaries and limit participation in the
project decision-making processes, thereby aﬀecting suggested evalua-
tion criteria of eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency and equity (the so-called 3Es,
focussing on beneﬁt-sharing following Stern (2006), which considers
equity in highly technical and distributional terms. See Angelsen (2008,
2009)). The aspects of rendering technical and anti-politics are key for
de-politicising the context that the project aims to address and through
authorising knowledge (of climate change or markets for example).
Anti-politics is therefore the process of separating direct technical ob-
jectives, such as conserving forests or increasing carbon sequestration,
from social transformation and political change (Bebbington, 2005;
Büscher, 2010).
We see analyses of rendering technical and anti-politics in the works
of Ferguson (1994) who critiques technical approaches in the ‘deploy-
ment of development’ and Li (2007b) who explores “expert” interven-
tions that attempt to improve the welfare of the poor through “devel-
opment”. Bernstein (1996) addresses the political nature of markets by
calling for a deeper exploration into “real markets”. Sikor and Pham
(2005) and Bourdieu (2005) show that just as markets are not simply
economic agreements among actors, land use decisions are highly po-
litical and cannot function without politicised relations. Rules around
these projects and markets are highly technical, guided as they are by
complex international laws, conventions and treaties. REDD+ is also
highly technical in its conceptualisation (ie. carbon stock and markets,
mapping, jurisdictional approaches, beneﬁt sharing) and language (ie.
trade-oﬀs, decarbonisation, biomass, additionality, biotrade) (UN-
REDD, 2015).
The process of bringing diverse interests together on a global scale
requires making some ‘trade-oﬀs’ (to use a technical term) in order to
come to consensus around the points on which actors can agree. These
trade-oﬀs result in critiques of global agreements as ‘watered down’ or
R. Myers et al. Global Environmental Change xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
2
‘toothless’; however, without rendering technical and anti-politics,
these initiatives may not take root at all. Anti-political policy discourse
is “required to conceal ideological diﬀerences, to allow compromise
and the enrolment of diﬀerent interests, to build coalitions, to distribute
agency and to multiply criteria of success within project systems”
(Mosse, 2004, p.663). It is therefore sometimes necessary in order to
galvanise actors with divergent perspectives around a trajectory of
change, be it reduction of deforestation, improvement of production, or
increased ‘social responsibility’. Global entities such as the United Na-
tions, World Bank, and World Trade Organization are limited in their
mandate to become engaged in the politics of the countries in which
they work, even if they recognise the importance of politics and poli-
tical solutions. As Li (2007b) shows, accounting for politics in projects
is inherently challenging. We understand the diﬃculty in pro-
blematising political quagmires in practical arrangements that can be
addressed and reported on under the auspices of “development” pro-
jects, and analyse some of the implications for REDD+ and other global
climate change initiatives.
2.2. Justice and legitimacy
Conservation, PES and REDD+ projects are often framed in dis-
tributive terms (Walker, 2009; Fraser, 2003), conceptualising justice, or
fairness (Rawls, 1999; Clayton, 1998), as the equitable distribution of
economic beneﬁts and costs (Fraser, 2009). Several studies on equity
within REDD+ take this approach (eg Nathan and Pasgaard, 2017).
More fundamentally, however, distributive justice refers to the equi-
table distribution, or redistribution, of wealth and resources (Fraser,
2000). McDermott et al. (2013) argue that PES project implementers
ought to conceptualise justice more broadly than simply distributive
notions of fairness or equity. These larger notions of justice, which are
trickier for projects to operationalise, include recognition and re-
presentation (Fraser, 2009; Walker, 2009; Schlosberg, 2007; Forsyth
and Sikor, 2013; Faye, 2015; Taylor 1994; Nikolakis et al., 2016; Martin
et al., 2016; Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Recognition refers to social
status, and overcoming subordination (Fraser, 2000). Representation
refers to political participation, or participation in decision making
more broadly (Fraser, 2009). Recognition and representation are cen-
tral notions of justice, which we link to the legitimacy of projects below.
They are political in the sense that diﬀerent actors and stakeholders
may deﬁne recognition and representation justice diﬀerently, and may
contest whether or not they have been achieved (Fraser, 2003).
Sikor and Stahl (2011) found that representation (in a procedural
sense) was lacking in forest governance projects because local forest
users were not invited to participate in making decisions aﬀecting forest
governance (see also Mosse, 2004). At a deeper level, projects are often
pushed to be apolitical, or even anti-political, by foundations and bi-
lateral donors. Li (2007b) and Ferguson (1994) show how large-scale
projects, especially implemented by the State or multilateral develop-
ment actors, do this in order to nudge the initiatives forward, but fail to
realise that the delays and failures they experience are rooted in ig-
noring political processes rather than pulling the right technical lever.
As a result, project proponents are actively discouraged from identi-
fying and incorporating these political dimensions of justice, which deal
directly with power and require socio-political transformations far be-
yond what, say, a coﬀee agroforestry project would provide on its own.
We understand recognition and representation as fundamentally
about meaningful participation in decision-making, including having a
seat at the table, having a voice, and ultimately having power (Lidskog
and Elander, 2007; Fraser, 2009). Fraser (2003, 2009) argues that
justice is ‘parity of participation’ and that parity of participation re-
quires that conditions of material distribution, representation, and re-
cognition be met. In this framing, participation is not merely a proce-
dural activity that leads to justice, but justice itself, because
participation necessarily implies having a voice and the power to secure
material and non-material objectives.
There are risks, though, that projects may appear to be inclusive and
participatory by meeting certain technical criteria but nevertheless
exclude or fail to represent all ‘stakeholders’, another technical term
(Sørensen and Torﬁng, 2009). It is not enough to have merely osten-
sible representation in decision-making spaces, or even necessarily a
seat at the table; citizens or project stakeholders also need to have real
mechanisms to elect their leaders and hold them accountable, ensuring
that their interests, including material resource distribution and re-
cognition of rights, are represented and backed by powers (cf. Ribot,
2011). The relationships among these dimensions, or notions, of justice
are complex (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). For example, in our cases,
recognition is tied to both the social status of marginalised populations
and to their rights to land and natural resources (distributive justice), as
well as to their right to participation and representation.
Sikor and Newell (2014) suggest that justice is a ‘constitutive ele-
ment’ of legitimacy. Distinctions between diﬀerent notions of justice
and legitimacy are neither ﬁxed nor independent of one another. One
conceptualisation of legitimacy is that it is a conﬁrmation of recogni-
tion (Morris, 1998; Kowler, 2013). Legitimacy refers to “the way in
which rules and outcomes are negotiated, administered and accepted
by stakeholders, including a fair distribution of decision-making power”
(Corbera and Schroeder, 2011, p.94). In this way it refers both to the
process and its outcomes, and a legitimate process is more likely to lead
to a legitimate, or valid, outcome.
The extent to which diﬀerent notions of justice are employed has a
direct inﬂuence on legitimacy. Following Fraser’s idea of justice, we
propose that more legitimate outcomes will be associated with projects
or initiatives that address not only the technical aspects of distribution,
but also its political aspects, together with recognition and re-
presentation. Failure to address political notions of justice leads to il-
legitimacy. Legitimate processes are more likely to lead to a match
between the notions of justice employed by projects and those con-
sidered important by local people.
The question of why some notions of justice (if any) are in-
corporated into project design and implementation and others are not
has to do with politics, and how compatible these notions of justice are
with the project implementers’ and funders’ objectives (cf. Mosse,
2004). Speciﬁcally in REDD+, the process of rendering technical has
established the sources of authority in REDD+ at a global scale, which
McDermott et al. (2012) argue are government sovereignty, ﬁnance and
market-based mechanisms (voluntary carbon markets). These sources
of authority are particularly prone to rendering projects technical and
advancing an anti-politics agenda, because they are ostensibly politi-
cally ‘neutral’ and are guided by anti-political discourses (cf. Li, 2007b;
Ferguson, 1994). On the ground, these sources of authority are subject
to re-interpretation and “translation” (Sanders et al., 2017) by multiple
intervening actors. These re-interpretations may be subject to more
divergent understandings the larger the project and the more global
actors involved (Martin et al., 2016). Although anti-politics may be
perceived by policy-makers as the only way to operationalise their in-
itiatives, is this the Achilles’ heel of conservation and REDD+ projects?
We use these theories to frame and understand our data, and come
back to them in our discussion section, which suggests the ways that
these theories may work together toward what we understand as
‘messiness’. All of the cases studied share two common features: (1)
they are heavily inﬂuenced by global-level actors and (2) they have
direct impact on both local people and the forests on which they de-
pend. We conduct an empirical analysis of multi-level governance
systems to better understand why (some) projects fail and why there are
so frequently claims of injustice that serve to de-legitimise projects and
authorities, leading to ineﬀectiveness if not immediately, over time.
Before sharing our results, we explain the methods we used to collect
and analyse data.
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3. Methods
Our data are from 742 semi-structured interviews from 54 cases of
land use and land use change in Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Tanzania and
Vietnam with actors from local communities, governments from local to
national, companies, NGOs and indigenous peoples’ organisations col-
lected from 2013 to 2015. The purpose of the research was to under-
stand how land use change occurred and the role and inﬂuence of in-
itiatives to control deforestation and forest degradation. The dataset
was derived from interviews regarding authority, beneﬁt sharing, le-
gitimacy, ‘fairness’, drivers of deforestation and relationships among
actors from a multi-level governance perspective in land use changes.
Interview questions (see Burga et al., 2015) were informed by a detailed
literature review (see Saito-Jensen, 2015) and crafted into key in-
formant and case study instruments speciﬁcally tailored for government
oﬃcials, village leaders, corporate project proponents, and civil society.
Interviewers were then trained and had access to a ﬁeld research
training guide.
In each country, we selected two to three sub-national jurisdictions
(provinces, states, or districts) that key informants identiﬁed as having
a mix of activities driving deforestation as well as initiatives aimed at
conservation and/or decreasing carbon emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation. Within each sub-national jurisdiction, we se-
lected about ﬁve sites based on key informant interviews: both REDD+
and non-REDD+ project areas, as well as sites of deforestation. Further
details on the cases are available in the country reports for Indonesia
(Myers et al., 2016), Peru (Kowler et al., 2016), Mexico (Trench et al.
forthcoming), Tanzania (Kijazi et al., 2017) and Vietnam (Yang et al.,
2016). Table 1 provides an overview of the cases in each country by
type of land use change.
Interview notes were entered into QSR NVIVO and coded by re-
searchers in each country using a common coding tree with the main
concepts we analysed based on an extensive literature review (see
Ravikumar et al., 2015). Each country developed a working paper,
which analysed the main ﬁndings from the eight to 14 cases studied in
each country.
For this contribution, we analysed interview notes by querying land
use conﬂict, procedural legitimacy, and outcome legitimacy codes. This
resulted in 361 interviews (Indonesia n= 98, Mexico, n= 52, Peru
n=112, Vietnam n=99) for analysis, covering all countries in our
study. Within these interviews, we also performed some free text
searches of keywords such as ‘expectation’ (22 interviews), ‘promise’
(19 interviews) and ‘fair’ (123 interviews). At the time of drafting this
document, data from all countries except Tanzania were entered in the
database. Therefore, we used the country report to include data from
Tanzania.
4. Results
We organise our ﬁndings by three overarching features of the gov-
ernance systems of projects that we identiﬁed across countries and land
use types. First, concerns regarding distribution were limited to the
technical lens of ‘beneﬁt sharing”. Second, and related to the ﬁrst, the
focus on the technical most often came at the expense of recognition of
local people, and importantly of their rights to territory or land, and of
their representation or meaningful participation. Third, the lack of re-
presentation and recognition justices resulted in illegitimacies. We ex-
plore these three ﬁndings here using empirical evidence from the cases.
4.1. Distributive justice as ‘beneﬁt sharing’
Beneﬁt-sharing is a central tenet of REDD+ (Luttrell et al., 2013).
Most of the projects (REDD+, conservation, and non-conservation) we
studied had some sort of beneﬁt-sharing scheme, often framing ‘co-
beneﬁts’ in anti-political terms, aimed either at compensating com-
munity members for losses (eg. restricting access to a conservation area
and giving seedlings to plant on farmland) or providing incentives in-
tended to change behavior (eg. developing livelihood options that en-
courage activities that avoid deforestation). Speciﬁc measures included
the distribution of cash beneﬁts, as well as non-cash co-beneﬁts such as
capacity-building, livelihoods development and so on. We are careful
not to frame these distributive (or even technical) solutions as ne-
cessarily negative, and understand them as part of realising solutions to
complex problems. Nevertheless, beneﬁt sharing was a primary source
of conﬂict, and the legitimacy of technical solutions depended largely
on the extent to which they aligned with local notions of justice and
political realities.
A few of the projects provided some kind of cash beneﬁt although
more were set up to do so pending funding, such as from REDD+ or
carbon agreements, in the future. Tanzania is probably the country
where cash payments at a number of REDD+ pilot project sites were
designed most explicitly as experiments. The various pilot projects took
diﬀerent approaches. The MJUMITA/TFCG project may have done the
most to assure alignment with the preferences of villagers: speciﬁc
distribution rules were made by community members via village as-
semblies and set in village by-laws; project implementers organised
meetings at the sub-village level prior to these larger assemblies, in-
cluding with women and other relatively marginalised community
members, to improve overall participation and representation (Kijazi
et al., 2017).
Cash payments in Vietnam’s national PES program, which was not
designed with community input, were more problematic. In Dien Bien,
a respondent found it diﬃcult to assess the fairness of the distribution
of beneﬁts from the project. “People who get higher payments think
that this is a fair arrangement. Meanwhile, local people, who get small
payments, think that this arrangement is unfair,” he commented.
Furthermore, intra-village beneﬁt sharing is commonly perceived as
fair, as each household received an equal payment per hectare. Inter-
village distributions resulted in perceived injustices from a wider per-
spective as there could be large disparities in payment amounts be-
tween villages (cf. Loft et al., 2017).
Non-monetary beneﬁts were more common across the cases. In
some sites, respondents emphasised that their so-called ‘co-beneﬁts’
were in fact the most important beneﬁts that initiatives delivered to
communities. Co-beneﬁts included increased knowledge about eco-
system services, technical skills for improved production systems such
as agroforestry, conservation management, leadership skills, awareness
of laws and standards, livelihood development and territorial planning.
These beneﬁts were disproportionately mentioned by project im-
plementers rather than by community members themselves. Two-thirds
(102/153) of respondent mentions of capacity building as a co-beneﬁt
came from State respondents. Another 12 per cent came from national
NGOs. Consequently, several of the espoused ‘co-beneﬁts’ included
“awareness of the park and processes” as mentioned by a State oﬃcial
in San Martin, Peru. Forest-protection projects in Vietnam also high-
lighted awareness of rules as a beneﬁt.
Aside from diﬀerent notions of what constitutes a ‘beneﬁt’, project
implementers and communities did not always have the same inter-
pretation of what is equitable or fair. For example, unequal distribution
of land in a community forest project led by local actors in West
Table 1
Total of cases by country and dominant land use change.
Indonesia Mexico Peru Tanzania Vietnam
Conservation non-REDD+ 3 2 3 – 3
Conservation REDD+ 3 4 6 7 1
Non-conservation (agriculture,
plantations, livestock,
hydropower, mining,
charcoal production and
mining)
4 4 5 5 4
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Kalimantan, Indonesia, was justiﬁed by community members because it
was based on customary land tenure and the areas of land cultivated by
their ancestors. Even though the distribution was uneven, it was con-
sidered fair because decisions were embedded in customs and politics.
In Mexico, a PES project recognised the land tenure status quo estab-
lished by a system of seniority, and was largely considered legitimate by
ejido (common land parcel) members, even by some of those who were
excluded. Initiatives that failed to take local interpretations of equity
into account were more contested.
The implementation, or even prospective implementation, of land
use change is not only interpreted politically at many levels, but also
shapes the politics among actors aﬀected by the change. We saw this in
all types of land use change and starting at early planning stages. Local
politics, which may have included dormant contestations, came to the
fore when new opportunities to derive beneﬁts were presented as part
of the (technical) rollout of REDD+ initiatives. This happened in the
case of a REDD+ pilot in Central Kalimantan, which spurred con-
testation among communities when project implementation began. We
found more mentions of conﬂict in this case than any other in our study.
The majority of conﬂicts were between communities and the national
government’s REDD+ project implementer and were rooted in histor-
ical relations (Sanders et al., 2017). Other issues, as we found in a
functioning PES project in Mexico, relate to struggles to ensure that
cash beneﬁts were not captured by local elites, which proved to be
deeply political.
Beneﬁt-sharing challenges were commonly characterised by con-
ﬂicts among actors (31% of conﬂicts mentioned by respondents), pri-
marily related to issues between communities and the State or com-
panies, and often over land claims. Other challenges commonly
mentioned included lack of clarity or information (22%), ﬁnancial is-
sues regarding distribution, payment terms etc. (19%) and diﬀering
interpretations of the process or aims of the land use change (15%).
Diﬀerences of understanding between local communities and project
implementers and/or the State were common. As one respondent from
Central Kalimantan mentioned, doing business with the State is diﬃcult
for local communities, because the bureaucracy is too complicated.
Nevertheless, is it important to note that technical solutions, in
some cases, equipped local communities to align with legal require-
ments to make claims based on customary land use. For example, some
projects included mapping exercises, which supported land claims by
communities in Indonesia and Peru (although none of these mapping
exercises led directly to the transfer of ownership rights to commu-
nities). Although intended for land use planning in the projects, com-
munity groups aspired to use them as explicitly political tools, or at
least perceived that their claims to land might be more secure after
being ‘oﬃcially’ mapped. Processes that included participatory, com-
munity-led exercises were not always free of contestation, but when
negotiated through discussion and when customary land use allocations
were incorporated, they were near-universally considered to be legit-
imate. We also saw the inverse, in which social forestry mapping re-
cognised only a portion of claimed customary land and was therefore
seen by some community members as illegitimate and a barrier to fu-
ture customary claims (see Myers et al., 2017).
One case in particular demonstrates the conﬂicts between the
technical beneﬁt-sharing approach and more substantive distributive
justice (also associated with recognition justice, in this case). In a na-
tional park case in West Kalimantan, community members refused
‘beneﬁt sharing’ and compensatory payments of employment, payment
for environmental services, and infrastructure development as they
interpreted acceptance of any compensation to signify an admission of
State authority over what they claimed as their customary forest land –
a claim that the state refused to recognise (Myers and Muhajir, 2015).
In this case, recognition of their land right was the only legitimate so-
lution.
4.2. Representation and recognition
Representation and recognition are salient issues across the cases,
yet many projects failed to address them in substantive ways. This
section highlights the nature and importance of these two concerns in
the study sites, while the next section focuses on the illegitimacies re-
sulting from the failure to address them.
Our ﬁndings most relevant to representation justice are probably
those related to the ways in which local people were involved in pro-
jects such as through free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) me-
chanisms, or beyond consent, to full engagement (through accountable
representation) in project design and decision making. Many projects
sought some form of community consent, but this ranged from door-to-
door household discussions to communications only with community
leaders. In a few cases, project implementers did not provide full in-
formation because they did not want to generate unreasonable ex-
pectations, speciﬁcally with regard to REDD+, or they failed to provide
information that was understandable, due to the complexities of REDD
+. The legitimacy of these processes appear closely related to the depth
of engagement, as well as to historical relationships. Where these re-
lations were problematic, as in some areas near nature reserves in
Tanzania or in the former Mega Rice project areas in Central
Kalimantan, communities were considerably more distrustful.
In a REDD+ case in Ucayali, Peru, project proponents created a
‘representative organisation’ made up of community indigenous au-
thorities to avoid dealing directly with the broader community. The
communities agreed because it would provide them a voice to which
the project proponents would listen. The solution was eﬃcient for the
project proponents, but hardly eﬀective for communities, as they saw
their perspectives ﬁltered through a small group that had little decision-
making power and struggled to communicate technical project in-
formation to the local farmers they represented.
As mentioned previously, recognition of forest-based populations is
closely tied to land rights. And other studies have noted the importance
of land tenure particularly for REDD+ (Sunderlin et al., 2014) and
many PES schemes. Yet across the sites, land tenure, if addressed, was
often seen more as an instrumental or technical concern than as an issue
of justice based on recognition and social inclusion (cf. Larson et al.,
2013); this contrasts with grassroots demands, but it does not mean that
local people do not take advantage of mapping initiatives as political
tools. A notable exception was a community-based forestry project in
West Kalimantan facilitated by a national NGO in which great eﬀorts
were made to encourage a wide range of community stakeholders to
participate in the scheme. A map was developed using customary land
allocations and all but two households in the community participated in
the mapping, rule-making, and planning of the scheme.
Some of the pilot REDD+ projects in Tanzania pushed successfully
for the reinterpretation of existing land laws to allow for the recognition
of village lands that had previously been classiﬁed as general public
lands. Several of the Peru cases demonstrated eﬀorts to reduce threats
to land-tenure security by setting up mechanisms to stop encroachment
into project areas. Local people control these areas in return for other
beneﬁts, but also beneﬁt from the collective eﬀort to secure their own
properties. However, in only a few cases (in Peru and Tanzania) did the
project proponent make a concrete commitment to secure land titles for
local people.
The most salient challenge for projects was addressing land con-
ﬂicts. A provincial government oﬃcial in Central Kalimantan,
Indonesia mentioned that forest governance systems (regulations) had
failed due to land conﬂicts. Across the cases, both REDD+ and non-
REDD+, these conﬂicts were primarily between local communities and
government (n=201), followed by communities and companies
(n= 51, mostly in non-conservation cases) and communities against
communities (n=43).
Vietnamese, Peruvian and Indonesian cases exempliﬁed community
against community struggles involving migrants. As one village level
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respondent in Vietnam explained, “In the last few years, there have
been 11 households of H’mong ethnic group newly migrated to Huoi
Vang village. These households have destroyed around 10 ha of forests
for their agricultural cultivation.” Further conﬂicts among communities
were often based on customary claims that had dormant contestations
triggered by the implementation of a project. In Tanzania, communities
claimed forest areas for REDD+ that other villages had previously ac-
cessed, leading to conﬂict. Community against community land con-
ﬂicts in all countries reﬂected contested boundaries and land resource
uses for ranching, agriculture, and forests. In some cases, such as in
Muong Pon, Vietnam, community members were pitted against one
another on ideological grounds: preventing land degradation on sloping
lands versus agricultural expansion for livelihoods. In others, commu-
nities wanting agricultural production were united against the State,
which wanted to protect forests as in Con Ken, Vietnam, and against a
company on deforested rubber plantations as in Tin Toc, Vietnam.
REDD+ cases showed some ability to respond to conﬂict even when
they stemmed from lack of attention to recognition and representation.
A REDD+ case in Vietnam showed that the project implementers
worked with local communities to ensure systems of clear commu-
nication and problem solving that ensured better representation.
Similarly, in Indonesia, procedures for communicating and working
with communities were changed in a REDD+ project that experienced
signiﬁcant resistance by some communities and grassroots NGOs. The
change, in the form of community consultations and agreements that
ensured better clarity and participation in decision-making processes,
motivated some disconcerted communities to continue with the project.
In the Peruvian Alto Mayo REDD+ project, an NGO partnered with
the government to make conservation agreements with local settlers
who were occupying a protected area and would otherwise be threa-
tened with expulsion. Local communities initially resisted the deal be-
cause they believed their land was being bought up by the NGO and its
corporate partner. Responding to these charges, the NGO carried out a
much more far-reaching participatory information sharing process, to
ensure that local people understood the project. The process won over
many people living in the area, who, based on their limited options, saw
the process as legitimate and the project as their best option. The
project now signs conservation contracts with households, renewed
annually, which grant them technical support to improve coﬀee pro-
duction in return for zero deforestation. Nevertheless, some people did
not wish to participate in the program - another case demonstrating
how distribution options have been rejected by those who still believe
their land rights should be recognised.
4.3. Legitimacy
Legitimate initiatives to change land use practices required much
more substantial attention to social justice. When projects failed to
address recognition and representation, or addressed deep-seated pro-
blems only with technical responses, conﬂicts tended to bubble to the
surface and claims of illegitimacy were made by some stakeholders.
Failures of recognition included a lack of attention to cultural practices
and territorial claims. Failures of representations comprised a lack of
voice or power in decision-making processes, which often included
coerced or extremely limited participation (including an over-reliance
on a small number of leaders to represent local community interests) for
so-called consent. Several of our cases demonstrate clearly ﬂawed
processes, including for obtaining consent, as well as confusion and lack
of transparency that aﬀected the overall legitimacy of the project.
We can learn about this from non-REDD+ cases. In San Martin
Peru, conﬂict arose between migrants and Awajun indigenous people.
The 14 Awajun communities in the area existed in relative peace with
migrants since they started arriving in the 1960s, fostered by State
settlement programmes. The Awajun beneﬁtted from rents they
charged the migrants for access to land for agriculture, whilst the
Awajun people continued to subsist primarily on hunting and
gathering, as they had done historically. As a local Awajun resident
explained, there were few problems until the Awajun became more
aware of the eﬀects of renting out land, speciﬁcally deforestation and
commensurate loss of wildlife, and sought to evict migrants from their
land. The migrants claimed use rights and the framing of migrants by
the Awajun shifted from one of co-existence based on land rents to a
discourse of ‘invasion’. Therefore, while outcomes were once con-
sidered legitimate, they now consider the migrants as illegitimate in-
vaders. Similarly, in a national park case in West Kalimantan,
Indonesia, prior ‘consent’ by community leaders was based on sup-
pressing an immediate threat (real or perceived) of logging in the area.
A State forestry oﬃcial obtained the signatures of local communities
required to enact the park in the 1970s and 1980s, and villagers report
that there was little visible discontent in the communities until almost
20 years later, when conﬂict arose based on claims of customary
ownership over now protected forests and the right to engage in live-
lihood activities on those lands. In these cases, the messiness of political
realities arose from the implementations of distributive notions of jus-
tice based on illegitimate processes, which ignored recognition and
representational notions of justice.
In many cases, promises were made by project proponents, but were
not fulﬁlled. As one Indonesian village level actor commented, the
REDD+ implementer “always said yes to us every meeting, but in
practice [they] started to implement diﬀerently to what was said in the
meeting.” Project implementers used “sweet words”, according to
community members in Indonesia, to entice community consent to the
project, but when local communities realised that promises of ﬁnancial
beneﬁt-sharing and co-beneﬁts are either delayed or ‘forgotten’, le-
gitimacy became severely compromised. Some villagers described the
promises as having been “forgotten” and regretted not documenting the
pretenses under which the communities issue ‘consent’ to the land use
change. Another form of broken promises mentioned by community
members was politicians making promises during elections. Frustration
also arose from diﬀering promises between lead actors. In Dien Bien,
Vietnam, villagers were left confused by competing promises made by a
rubber plantation company, district government and provincial gov-
ernments. In Chiapas, Mexico, the state government unilaterally laun-
ched a ‘REDD+’ programme in 2011, exclusively favouring one ex-
tensive agrarian community in the Lacandon Forest in a clear bid to win
political capital and cement political loyalties in a region with a history
of armed insurgency. This program distributed cash payments amongst
the 1700 rights holders with no mechanisms for MRV (monitoring,
reporting and veriﬁcation) and was seen as unjust by other regional
actors; it severely aﬀected the legitimacy of REDD+ in the state, to the
extent that for several years most actors preferred to talk of low emis-
sions development and not REDD+.
Corruption, coercion and omissions of information were also fre-
quent causes of claims of injustice and procedural illegitimacy. These
issues arose with the allocation of land, questionable permissions issued
to land users (mostly companies) by local leaders and government of-
ﬁcials, and preferential distributions of beneﬁts. In Mexico, a land-
holder in a REDD+ scheme stated, “I know that [the project im-
plementer] has been giving out higher payments, up to 1000 pesos per
hectare. But they only accept their personal friends into this program.
That’s because, in the neighbouring community of Nuevo Mundo and
Tekal, there are government oﬃcials who have personal interests. One
government counsellor has 400 ha there that are in the PES scheme,
along with another 600 ha in PES in Campeche: this means he receives
in only one payment a million pesos! Corruption is really a mess.”
Problems related to transparency featured prominently. In an at-
tempt to temper the expectations of villagers, implementers of a REDD
+ case in Peru withheld information pertaining to the project.
Although done to ‘protect’ communities, this strategy of omissions ul-
timately backﬁred and resulted in distrust among community members
of the company, which had to be dispelled later. In more suspect cases,
such as the national park case in Indonesia, failure to disclose
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implications of the creation of the park resulted in intense conﬂict be-
tween the State and communities. At times, lack of information was
about the proposed land use change (including local communities being
misled) and in others, about possible alternatives that communities
could consider along with potential burdens from associated land use
change. We therefore found several cases of illegitimacy stemming from
incomplete information and omissions by project proponents. Although
communities were ‘informed’, the information was incomplete and
often insuﬃcient for informed consent.
Though identifying illegitimacy is fairly straightforward, due to
contestation or conﬂict, legitimacy is more problematic, as citizens may
accept their circumstances without open complaint or conﬂict for a
variety of reasons, such as fear, lack of viable solutions or hopelessness.
Claimants of illegitimacy and injustice were also found to sacriﬁce the
political, sometimes seen as too messy (or perhaps risky), in order to
obtain technical distributive beneﬁts. For example, a villager involved
in the development of a community forest (a form of temporary forest
management rights supervised by the State) in West Kalimantan,
Indonesia, understood that management rights fell short of the com-
munity’s primary claim of customary ownership of the forest, but sug-
gested that management rights are “better than nothing”. In Vietnam,
allocation of forest rights is equated to decentralisation of forests to
local people, but forestland was originally seized by the government as
State property, and overall allocation shows preferences still towards
state organisations (Phuc and Nghi, 2014). In most cases, poorer quality
forests have been returned to communities in comparison, but with
heightened usage restrictions and burdens (thereby less rights). Com-
munities accepted this transition as it provides them with technical
authority over forests, but fails to satisfy political customary claims that
aﬀords communities with control over customary lands. In all of these
examples, there is clear evidence of legitimacy, but the expectations of
community members have been tempered, leading to acceptable (for
the moment) outcomes achieved through lackluster procedures re-
sulting from multiple negotiated trade-oﬀs.
Projects regarded as more legitimate by local communities often
featured discussions among community members and project propo-
nents about risks and alternatives, and were careful not to set false
expectations. By engaging community-members in decision-making
(albeit with likely diﬀerential powers), and using customary logics re-
garding resource access rights, projects were viewed as more legitimate
by community members. This was especially clear in projects with re-
duced roles for global actors. In El Ocote, Chiapas, Mexico, the local
NGO organising carbon valuation explained the potential for carbon
sales, but was cautious to ensure that expectations were not raised. In
West Kalimantan, community members agreed to set up a social for-
estry project understanding the risks that carbon sales may not be
feasible. At the same time, local people achieved this level of partici-
pation by insisting upon it with their allies. The bilateral REDD+ pilot
project in Central Kalimantan changed its approach part way through
its implementation amidst resistance from some villagers and NGOs
about the rigid implementation structure of the project, and emphasised
the importance of transparency and expectation management.
5. Discussion
We now turn back to the theories we introduced in the beginning of
this contribution and consider how our ﬁndings relate to rendering
technical and distribution, lack of representation and recognition, and
illegitimacy. We focus this discussion on how our ﬁndings relate to one
another in a framework we suggest can be understood as messiness. We
ﬁrst provide an analysis of our empirical data and then show our pro-
posed model of messiness, on which we invite feedback from other
scholars.
5.1. Analysis of empirical data
The focus on ‘beneﬁt sharing’ by project implementers shows a
preference for the technical. Disproportionate reporting of beneﬁts by
project implementers indicates the diﬀerences in deﬁnition of what a
beneﬁt is. The state oﬃcial in San Martin, Peru who cited awareness of
park rules as a beneﬁt to local people illustrates this point well. In any
case, receiving a project beneﬁt is far from addressing underlying
economic inequities. This is epitomised in the national park case in
West Kalimantan, Indonesia, where local people refused the beneﬁts
oﬀered to them by the park authorities on the basis that accepting these
beneﬁts would compromise their more fundamental objective of forcing
the state to recognise their customary land claims.
We observed less conﬂict when distribution was based on custom, or
embedded in local notions of equity, rather than external ideas that
would disruptively transform them, in the sense that Polanyi (1945)
discusses. Even when distribution was unequal, it was sometimes un-
derstood as ‘fair’ on the grounds of custom. We found that many local
people considered custom to be a suﬃcient justiﬁcation for allocating
compensation. At the same time, we understand that while recognition
of custom is an important component of justice, it is not suﬃcient, and
may have its own embedded injustices (including injustices that fall
along gender, ethnic, or kinship lines). While this applied in Indonesia
and Mexican ejidos, Peru and Vietnam included several cases of mi-
gration in which migrants were framed as ‘invaders’ by indigenous
communities. We saw in Peru that migrants claimed rights in diﬀerent
ways than indigenous peoples- based on contractual arrangements
(distribution) rather than on customary land claims (recognition). This
technical argument by the migrants was argued in political terms by
indigenous peoples, resulting in messiness that will be challenging to
resolve as each party applies diﬀerent logics to their claims of justice.
Moreover, in Peru, diﬀerent sets of laws and norms are deployed to
secure recognition of private agricultural parcels or of collective in-
digenous territories; which of these institutions should govern con-
tested lands is of course itself subject to political contestation. In
Vietnam, relocations of populations were justiﬁed by the State, how-
ever claims to forest lands were contested from customary perspectives,
whose proponents were not involved in land use allocations.
Lack of complete information also jeopardises the freedom with
which community actors provide consent for land use change, if they
are aﬀorded the opportunity. Freedom is subject to a number of con-
ditions that can restrict or enable the extent to which actors have
choices (cf. Sen, 1999). With no other choice, or no awareness of an-
other choice, communities may be forced to consent to projects for lack
of other options. Instances of community members surprised by
changes, or experiencing outcomes inconsistent with promises and ex-
pectations, were found throughout our study. Limited community
consultations with village leaders sometimes resulted in consent, but we
found that even when protest was not evident in early stages of the
project, it arose several years, or even a generation, later, as in a na-
tional park case in Indonesia (Myers and Muhajir, 2015). In these cases,
we saw agreements that had often been made with dubious re-
presentation and participation of local community members and that
decisions were anti-political. REDD+ cases were no exception, and we
found cases in which several community members, sub-national gov-
ernment oﬃcials and NGOs claimed that they had inadequate in-
formation or access to fora for participation (see also Cromberg et al.,
2014; Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). While initial decisions may have
been uncontested, over time, they became messy as unclear rules were
enforced, and unmentioned restrictions to access to land or beneﬁts
were implemented. These claims of injustice could be understood as a
kind of backward looking generational justice (cf. Page, 2007) in which
claimants in the present contest the processes and outcomes made in
the past regardless of how they were interpreted at the time (see Myers
and Muhajir, 2015 for more detail).
While the extent to which communities were free and informed is
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questionable in many cases, we also showed that prior consent, or
consent at any time, was absent from many of the initiatives. These
cases may represent the most overt forms of illegitimacy; they are the
most recognisable at early stages of project implementation. Over time,
however, as unkept promises become apparent, or communities learn
about other possible land use options, other illegitimacies can also
come to light.
Meanwhile, we saw that while ‘participation’ was valued by a range
of actors across the cases and countries, understandings of participation
varied considerably. Project implementers and authorities often inter-
preted participation as meeting a minimum standard (legal, or other-
wise accepted), which might be, for example, holding an informational
meeting or obtaining the signature of an elected leader. However, the
authority of the leader to consent was often contested, thereby dis-
equating to representation. Community members voiced concerns that
they were not represented in decisions even when there was compliance
with statutory laws. In other instances, we saw consent by coercion and
mandatory participation which ensured the illusion of participation
through attendance, but, as respondents reported, little space to voice
opinions, let alone eﬀect change.
Recognition was elusive across the cases. Even though community
members were sometimes aﬀorded rights to manage forest areas (based
on technical agreements and monitoring), claims over forest ownership
based on customary rights were often met with resistance by the State.
Yet the contestations and conﬂicts that were reported by respondents
were often framed in recognition terms based on cultural heritage,
custom, and land rights. At the same time, there were some conserva-
tion and REDD+ cases that exempliﬁed the need for clear and secure
land tenure not as an end in itself, or as a matter of recognition justice,
but as a precondition for eﬃcient and equitable distributions of market-
derived monetary beneﬁts.
Addressing custom and local recognition requires a level of ﬂex-
ibility that is challenging for projects heavily inﬂuenced by global ac-
tors, like REDD+, which renders technical in order to come to global
consensus and constitute a ‘project’. Nevertheless, there is evidence that
the contestations that emerge precisely as a result of negotiating
‘messiness’ can lead to political wins for historically marginalised
groups. REDD+ and its market-driven logics were opposed globally by
the environmental left and some indigenous rights coalitions on the
grounds that commodifying forests for their stored carbon would lead
to land grabs (among other reasons). We have yet to see REDD+ result
in widespread land grabs. Yet, concerns with land grabs have galva-
nised political organisation to support indigenous rights, and this in-
ternational movement has forced at least some governments to think
seriously about recognising customary land rights for local people. One
major policy win for indigenous peoples that emerged from this
movement was the Indonesian constitutional court ruling of 2012 re-
quiring that customary land rights be legally recognised, even though
the details of precisely how they will be recognised remain unclear
(Myers et al., 2016).
5.2. The concept of messiness
We refer to the mismatches between diﬀerent stakeholders’ pre-
ferred notions of justice and legitimacy, and the notions of justice that
conservation and development projects deliver in practice, as ‘messi-
ness.’ In this context, ‘messiness’ refers to the political leakage from a
system rendered technical. Li (2007a) refers to “messiness” as the
complexity of the social world that is rendered technical. Our focus is
more on the remnants of a system rendered technical. Similarly, Cleaver
(2017) refers to messiness as complexity, where our use of the term is
speciﬁcally anti-political. For us, ‘Messiness’ is the manifestation of il-
legitimacies bubbling beneath the surface of initiatives, sometimes
showing itself in the forms of protest and conﬂict. Rendering technical
is diﬃcult to implement perfectly, and is surely aimed to simplify, to
avoid conﬂict, and to avoid the messiness of politics. Yet, failure to
address the logics of a wide range of stakeholders in a multi-level
governance system results in dissatisfaction, injustices, and questions
about the legitimacy not only of the project, but also of those who
authorise knowledge within the project and the sources of their au-
thority (see also McDermott et al., 2012). These failures, in turn, breed
“messiness”. While our framing is based on robust literatures on justice
and legitimacy discussed in Section 2, our concept of messiness both
suggests how justice and legitimacy can relate to one another and adds
some detail about the eﬀects of focussing on technical approaches and
ignoring political ones. We explain the relationships among justice,
legitimacy and messiness below.
Projects that fail to appreciate the complexity of politics are setting
themselves up for failure (Chhotray, 2007; Kashwan, 2013; Ferguson,
1994). As Rondinelli (2013) shows, the bigger the project, the more
technical and messy it will become. We argue that messiness can be
constructive by serving as an indicator that something in the govern-
ance systems needs to be corrected, which if addressed in a way that
actors consider just, could alleviate more signiﬁcant injustices. Since
multi-level governance is a process of constant negotiation (Marks,
1992), ﬁssures in project legitimacy are inevitable as powers shift
among actors. Messiness highlights these ﬁssures and provides an op-
portunity for actors to address underlying problems; however, as we
will show, anti-political ﬁxes can serve to perpetuate messiness and
illegitimacy.
Anti-politics is co-produced by both the project implementers and
the ‘subjects’ who may not see the project in the same way (Bending
and Rosendo, 2006; Büscher, 2010). As Chhotray (2007) found, depo-
liticised natural resource user groups eventually run into conﬂicts when
politics resurface. The technical nature of REDD+ accentuates anti-
politics, and therefore messiness, by working on issues directly per-
taining to land on which local people lay customary claims. Indigenous
rights discourses that stood in opposition to REDD+ have in some ways
been co-opted by the project itself, enlisting indigenous people in
technical and market-oriented activities such as monitoring carbon
stocks in their communities. At the same time, REDD+, PES and con-
servation projects feature their own terms, lexicon, conditions, and
notions of development and environmental management (cf. Gregorio
et al., 2015; Westholm and Arora-Jonsson, 2015; Sunderlin and
Atmadja, 2009). REDD+, for example, includes embedded notions of
forests: that they are assets to be protected, and that there are ways to
measure and make payments based on standards of management per-
formance (Sunderlin and Atmadja, 2009). Messiness therefore explains
why some actors shift to the logics of the technocrats in order to make
progress on their objectives or claims which might otherwise be hard to
couch in the political language and logics of the State or other actors
who inﬂuence land use.
Another source of messiness is politically-motivated (conscious or
subconscious) divergent interpretations of rules, processes, and objec-
tives (cf. Sanders et al., 2017; Pasgaard, 2015). When actors believe
they are addressing the same issue in the same ways, but actually have
diﬀerent interpretations, a latent form of messiness can emerge that
may only be evident once a diﬀerent perspective is adopted by a range
of actors. Projects can therefore be viewed as a success from one per-
spective but a failure from another (see Sanders et al., 2017 as an ex-
ample).
We suggest that messiness is at the same time an indicator of failures
to appreciate the political nature of projects (especially the through
recognition and representation, but also through distribution), and a
cause for what Li (2007a) calls ‘managing failure’, ‘anti-politics’ and
‘reassembling’ and we refer to as ‘ﬁxes’, which are often technical in
nature and perpetuate the cycle of messiness. Overt messiness may
result in protests that threaten the very existence of the project. In the
case of REDD+, for example, customary land rights claimants have
used the ‘No Rights, No REDD+’ mantra. In this call, claimants and
activists demand that land tenure rights be clariﬁed and secured before
REDD+ moves ahead. As a politically-charged demand, the complexity
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of which must be dealt with in political terms, it presents a major ob-
stacle to REDD+ as a whole (see Sunderlin et al. (2014) for more on the
obstacle that land tenure security presents to REDD+ implementation).
As messiness becomes evident to actors in decision making roles, these
actors have impetus to adjust the system to reduce the messiness. The
ways in which the system is adjusted may result in more or less mes-
siness, depending on what perspectives are taken into account, and how
open the project proponents are to engaging in politics.
We consider the links between the concepts in Fig. 1, which dia-
grams how REDD+, PES, and conservation projects, often guided by
global notions of justice, tend toward distributive solutions if they at-
tempt to address justice at all (cf. Sikor and Cầm, 2016; Luttrell et al.,
2013), thereby negating issues of representation and recognition. These
omissions result in illegitimacy from the perspectives of actors that
claim injustice. Lack of legitimacy leads to messiness though direct
discontent with representation and recognition in projects while tech-
nical ﬁxes to address protest and claims of injustice perpetuate these
cycles. Our argument is not that all distribution justices are technical,
but that they tend to be more operational than representation or re-
cognition in systems rendered technical.
As we see in our data, distributive notions of justice do not rely on
representation or recognition and are often used by authorities and
project implementers as the sole justice perspective in the projects, if
any justice lens is applied at all. This is to say that it is possible to have a
distributive notion of justice without any acknowledgement of non-
distributional claims that people make (Martin et al., 2016). Claims for
recognition can also be operationalised by authorities and project im-
plementers in distributional terms, resulting in oﬀering compensatory
economic beneﬁts for the loss of rights or access to resources, as we saw
in many of the cases. In this way, distribution served as a means to
placate claimants in order to bury more challenging justice claims.
Although the translation of non-distributional claims to distributional
claims tends to obscure more highly contested political demands, such
as for land rights recognitions, distribution can itself be political. This is
because the process of determining who gets what is a result of nego-
tiation among competing interests, with diﬀerent groups exercising
power to secure their material objectives: in other words, through
politics. The results of distribution are also highly political, especially
where equity is compromised (cf. Pasgaard and Chea, 2013). These
inequities can perpetuate or further formalise the status quo as in the
case of Mexican ejidos or in initiatives that are highly unfavourable to
speciﬁc groups such as land grabbing. We saw this in the ways in which
distributive notions of justice precipitated conﬂict as actors vied for
their share of the beneﬁts on oﬀer.
Our analysis informs the understanding of messiness by examining
justice and legitimacy as explanatory factors. It also points to several
indicators of messiness that would serve to make scholars and policy
makers more aware of the extent to which a project may be messy or
result in messiness. Messiness is manifested when there is injustice and
when injustice leads to illegitimacy.
6. Conclusion
Our central argument is that multi-level governance is not only
messy, but that messiness arises precisely from attempts to avoid it
through rendering technical and the lack of attention to political dy-
namics. We focus on land use change where we observe a preference for
technical approaches, especially in projects involving global actors such
as REDD+. Preferences for technical approaches contribute to messi-
ness by ignoring representation and recognition notions of justice, as
well as political dimensions of distributive justice. Global inﬂuences in
governance assemblages add complexity, and a propensity to manage
the conﬁnes of justice notions and objectives. Nominal understandings
of justice, whether or not they are articulated as such by governance
actors, tend toward technical distributive notions, based on ﬁnancial
compensation and beneﬁt sharing. Representation and recognition are
more diﬃcult to incorporate into global projects because of their in-
herently political nature. This results in legitimacy issues for a wide
range of actors, but usually for the less inﬂuential ones (communities
and some lower level governments).
One of the ways in which recognition and representation can be
better integrated into governance systems is through the transformation
of the institutions deﬁning ‘justice’ (or whatever equivalent they use)
(Fraser, 2009). To achieve parity of participation, thereby ensuring
legitimate governance institutions and processes, these more elusive
notions of justice must be incorporated into practices and institutions
with the power to inﬂuence both global and local conceptualisations of
justice. This requires challenging conservation and development the-
ories that are rooted in economic, punitive and technical distributive
notions of justice. By deﬁnition, achieving parity of participation in
land use change requires deliberation, a re-examining of positions of
actors to inﬂuence notions of justice and a challenge to existing in-
stitutions (both statutory and customary) that determine justice and
legitimacy at both local and global scales. Doing so would mean ‘em-
bracing the political’ in projects. Rather than putting the emphasis on
eﬃciency, protracted dialogue would allow space for recognition and
representation claims of justice to be voiced at the conceptualisation,
review and evaluation stages of global projects.
We have acknowledged that cleaning up the mess in systems ren-
dered technical and anti-political is a challenge. Projects, especially
global projects, are structured in such a way as to appeal to the broadest
range of actors possible, which may result in agreeing to the lowest
common technical denominators in order to ‘get something done’. We
argue, however, that the failure to deal with local politics has detri-
mental eﬀects on the legitimacy of REDD+ and conservation in-
itiatives. If lack of attention to representation and recognition results in
messiness, as we argue, incorporating these dimensions into project
planning and implementation would serve as an antidote to messiness.
This would require additional up-front eﬀorts to appreciate the claims
made by local actors living in forests and to design interventions, to-
gether with these actors, that address these challenges and feature re-
sponsive mechanisms that have the ability to inﬂuence future im-
plementations and policy. It remains to be seen if exceptional climate
initiatives such as the Dedicated Grant Mechanism for Indigenous
Peoples and Local Communities (DGM) of the World Bank’s Forest
Investment Program (FIP), or the Amazonian Indigenous REDD+ (RIA)
proposal in Peru and elsewhere, will present such an opportunity to
demonstrate what Li (2017) might call ‘transformative politics’ and in
which we emphasise political notions of justice.
REDD+ presents a special opportunity to shift the ways in which
institutions consider justice.
Although REDD+ is polycentric in the sense that it does not have a
singular leader that makes the rules (Sunderlin et al., 2015), and it has
come to refer to many things in practice, it does involve inﬂuential
global agencies such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the
Global Climate Fund. This means that with a deliberate eﬀort, coali-
tions supporting indigenous and local peoples’ land rights and
Fig. 1. Theoretical underpinnings of messiness.
Source: original by authors.
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participation can insist that the “+” portion of REDD+ inherently re-
quire parity of participation by better integrating recognition and re-
presentation with distributive notions of justice. Larson and Ribot
(2009) connected distribution and representation with the legitimacy of
REDD+, which our data reinforces. As governance scholars, we ﬁnd in
REDD+ an opportunity to enhance the sophistication with which jus-
tice might be considered, setting a precedent for reducing the messiness
of other types of global projects, through reducing the complexity of
technical systems and language, increasing parity of participation, en-
gaging proactively with harder political problems such as land rights,
and leading toward more legitimate governance arrangements.
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